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THE MAKING OF A CONSPIRACY: RUSSIAN EVANGELICALS
DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR.
by Andrey Ivanov

Andrey Ivanov studies Church History and Theology at the
Mennonite Brethren Biblical Seminary in Fresno, Ca. He also works
as an Archival Assistant at the Center for Mennonite Brethren
Studies.
On May 31, 2001, the Keston Institute News Service reported on a local law
adopted by Belgorod Regional Duma aimed at restricting Protestant and all nonOrthodox activities in Belgorod. Intended to play “a preservatory role,” as
formulated by Belgorod bishop Ioann, the new measures essentially prohibited any
public gatherings of the non-Orthodox where minors were present, and thus engage
in a religious activity without their parents’ consent. The regulations also sharply
reduced foreign missionary activity and made it virtually impossible for believers
without their own church building to rent atriums and other facilities. It also
expressed concern about the proliferation of foreign faiths, and missionary activities
spreading from the neighboring Ukraine.1
Although the law has yet to be validated by the Constitutional Court, it
exposed some of the discrepancies between the policy of the central government
and its enforcement in the provinces. Some of the prevailing trends within local
administrations’ public policies towards the non-Orthodox religious groups are
often very negative ones. It was estimated that 30 out of 89 regional governments
adopted restrictive religious laws after 1994.2 This particular Belgorod law, as well

1Geraldine Fagan. “RUSSIA: Belgorod's New Anti-Missionary Law.” Keston News
Service, 31 May 2001. Available at http://www.keston.org/knsframe.htm Also
same date article by Alexander Shipkov on the impact of the law.
2The presidential administration, however, sent briefings in almost each case
warning of the unconstitutionality of such decisions. US Department of State
Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Russia (Washington,
DC: Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1999). Available online at
www.state.gov or www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/ statedeptrussia0909.html .
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as the well-known 1997 act, aimed at better centralization of religious activities3 are
far less menacing than policies exercised by other countries in the region.4
However, they do show a significant deviation from the extraordinary laissez-faire
religious state policy of the years between 1991-1997. With the current
“Counteracting Anti-Extremist Activities” legislation on the table in the Federation
Council and the lack of conscientious objectors/civil service alternative5 it is clear
that the current religious policy of the Russian Federation is aimed at consolidating
the mechanisms of regulation of religious activities.
The underlying causes for these laws certainly are a subject of debate. Yet it
would be wrong to assume that the law adopted by the popularly elected Duma
would reflect nothing but the populist and nationally-protectionist biases seen in the
general society. Whereas the central government usually gets the most blame for
restraining freedoms, it is often the local ‘bosses’ who initiate and carry out these
restrictions by popular demand. While large segments of today’s Russia’s
population share some of these nationalistic sentiments, it is the central and not
local government that often attempts to mediate or suppress the militant fervor of
some groups. This is true in cases where Putin honored Pentecostal Union President
V. Murza in 2001 as Russia’s distinguished minister of the year (the first time for a
non-Orthodox) or took a stand against the growing anti-semitism.6 Nevertheless, the
government must face criticism and responsibility for the actions of religious
freedom violations in the provinces. This is especially relevant, given the long
legacy of persecution that was instigated not by the local but the central
government.

315 year presence in Russia requirement for organizations to register and enjoy full
rights in Russia.
4Take, for example, draconian anti-public-gatherings laws in Lukashenko’s
Belarus, or recent curbing of all non-Muslim activities in Central Asian states.
5Nizhni Novgorod is an exception, first region to develop alternative service
program.
6On Murza, 14 Feb 2001 “Russia: Putin Honors Protestants”
http://www.ripnet.org/triumphant/honor.htm On Anti-Semitism, see description of
Putin’s
Address
on
the
RTR
Television
http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/080202Russia.shtml .
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While most Christians in the West are aware of the persecution during the
Communist regime, often little attention is given to the repression under the Tsars.
It is true that the persecution in the 1860s, 70s, and 80s was far less fierce, and that
the1905 Manifesto gave a wide range of freedoms to the dissenters. Yet the onset of
World War I resurrected some of the most reactionary conservative elements in the
public and the government calling for a revanche against the religious minorities
who grew and consolidated themselves between 1905 and 1914. World War one
was a vivid example of the struggle that occurred not only in the political arena, but
also among Evangelicals themselves on how to respond to a new political reality.
Looking at the past, it may be easier to understand the responses and trends that
Evangelicalism developed here in the last 90 years.

WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF CONSPIRACY FEARS
The start of the First World War brought hope that the Russian Imperial
government would ease the left-right political hostilities, which characterized the
period of four consecutive elected Dumas. The prompt victory over AustriaHungary and the Germans would serve as a unifying idea for the conservatives and
liberals alike. However, the advances of Russian troops in the fall of 1914 were
short-lived. The year 1915 brought unexpected challenges for Russia and its
participation in the First World War. It was a year that brought Austro-German
troops east of the Vistula River and caused spontaneous Russian retreats from parts
of Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia and Galicia. The year 1915 critically altered the
military plans drawn by both the Central Powers and the Entente Cordiale. German
hope for the blitzkrieg through Flanders and Champagne en route to Paris in 1914
resulted in a stalemate, and hopes for pursuing considerable advances in the east by
Russian army were only partly realized in the strenuous victories in Galicia and
East Prussia. Meanwhile, Germany and Austria took steps to regroup their position
in order to abandon considerable advances in the West and concentrate on the
Eastern front instead. This resulted in 140 divisions of infantry and cavalry being

3

stationed in the east and only 91 in the west by September of 1915.7 Stronger
pressure from the reinforced Austro-German front led to surrender by the Russians
in Galicia, Warsaw, Kowno, the Vistula valley and other strategic locations. The
eastward flight of refugees blocking the army’s way created miserable conditions
amidst the troops.8 The technological and humanitarian dimensions of the war crisis
made the prospects of the noble retreat a la 1812 seem quite dim and the General
Staff frantically sought for ways to face the public in explaining the perplexity of
the situation.9
The Russian retreat itself was characterized by growing deficiencies in
ammunition, food, communication and transportation on the front. It became clear
that the country had to brace for a longer war than was originally planned and
expected. The German advances in 1915 exacerbated fears of the imminent defeat
of the Entente, and prompted more policy makers to look inward to detect any
impediments to the war effort. As the Kaiser’s soldiers marched into Warsaw, Lodz,
Kowno and Lutzk, there were more calls for further revision not only of Russia’s
military but also public policy. While modifications in military doctrine attempted
to stimulate defenses from external enemy troops, the internal public policy turned
to search for domestic forces that would be the most likely to commit sabotage. The
internal attack against these subversive elements was thus deemed as important as
external defense. Initiating and also inflating such fears, the press and the public (as
well as some governmental) opinion searched for scapegoats in their midst. Reports
of conspiracies moved beyond the realm of sheer rumors and were heralded
everywhere – from the rural Siberian steppes to the court of the Tsar himself. In
1915 it was easy to find published remarks a about Jewish conspiracy, a Catholic
conspiracy, about suspicious airplanes landing in forests belonging to Russian

7A. L. Sidorov, A.N. Guliyev, et al. Istoriya SSSR, Vol. VI ( Moscow: Nauka,
1968) 551. For more detailed insights into the situation at the Eastern Front, see the
discussion in Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (New York:
Henry Nolt &Co., 1994) 154-195.
8Ibid., but also a good discussion of the retreat in Michael T. Florinsky, The End of
the Russian Empire (New York: Collier Books, 1961) 194-205.
9Florinsky, 198-199.
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German farmers, German-influenced Socialist propaganda in the army, as well as
German plots in connection with the influences of Rasputin and the Tsarina on
Nicholas II.10 Treason and lack of patriotism became a label, that was attached to
revolutionaries, Social-Democrats, Germans, sectarians, pacifists, and to almost
everything non-Orthodox and non-Great Russian.
As a result, several groups in society were questioned about their loyalty and
patriotism toward the state. Among them were Jews, Catholics, Caucasian Muslims,
and Russia’s ethnic Germans. The property liquidation measures of 2 February and
13 December 1915, for example, afflicted Russian Germans' farms, while
promising to re-distribute the land owners’ estates to the landless peasant soldiers
on the front. The charge of pan-Germanism and social sabotage was also brought
against Russian Evangelical sectarians: Baptists, Stundists/Evangelical Christians,
Adventists, and some other groups. They were accused of a conspiracy to demolish
the two pillars upon which the Empire rested: the Monarchy and the Orthodoxy.
This essay will discuss a threefold conspiracy charge directed against the
Evangelicals. First, the conspiracy pertained to the realm of external affairs:
sectarians were simply the Kaiser’s tool to bring the Teutonic hordes, their faiths,
and Kultur to Russian soil. Second, the conspiracy implicated the Evangelicals in
internal political struggle: they were plotting together with socialists and anarchists
to overthrow the Monarchy. Third, the conspiracy accused the Evangelicals of
individualistic opportunism: they avoided military service and used the Bible to
defend their pacifist beliefs.
The causes of these accusations must be addressed at the outset. The
Russian reactionary forces blamed, among others, the religious dissenters because
of the Evangelicals’ inability to create a solid position about political issues during
the war. Their lack of organization and emphasis on individual (rather than

10While the press openly criticized Rasputin’s and the Tsarina’s powers, others
wanted to take the initiative into their hands. In 1915, the Tsar’s trusted general,
Alekseev was involved in planning a plot to kidnap ethnically German Alexandra,
relieving the Tsar from the pro-German influences of his wife and Rasputin.
K.P.Kramarz, Russkiy Krizis (Paris: Rapid-Impremerie, 1925) 237-238.
5

corporate) political ethics put Evangelical sectarians on various spectrums of
opinion about the war, the Tsar and post-1905 democracy. The ethnic Germans
Vereins, sent their senators, bankers, and attorneys to convince the Emperor of their
patriotism. Sectarians, on the other hand, had little economic or political influence
and no political parties of their own. Sensitive to individualist interpretation of
ethics and Scripture in general, Evangelicals had not developed a sense of
denominational identity. Many decided to sustain relations with other dissenting
and minority groups, not always because of ideology but because of their common
plight. Among these groups were Jews, Socialists, Molokans, and Old Believers.
Again, there was no common institution to give definition to their political attitudes,
and there was no framework within which the Evangelicals could determine on
which sides of the political spectrum they ought to be. Some chose one, others
chose the other, often based on the functional sympathies of the classes they
represented (which were mostly lower ones).
In short, the dissent never fully institutionalized itself before the war.
Evangelicals were a diverse movement dating its origins back to 1860s. Some
groups, like the Evangelical Christians, first founded ‘house churches’ back in
1860s, but the Evangelical Christian Union was only formed in 1909, and the
Baptist Union, in 1880. They had no confessions of faith until the early 1900s.
Though accused of ‘Western rationalism’ by the Orthodox, the Evangelicals shared
many common traits with the so-called ‘irrational’ sects: Molokans, Tolstovites,
and Malevantsy. Having maintained a marginality in society, Evangelicals found
themselves at odds with the state that demanded organized affiliation and
unanimous support of the war.

THE NATURE OF THE CONSPIRACIES
In January 1917, the Chief Chaplain of the Army and the Navy complained
to Commander V. I. Romeiko-Gurko that the Evangelical soldiers likened the war
between Germany and Russia to an ancient battle between the faithful Hebrews and
the pagans in Palestine. They saw faithful Germans as Hebrews fighting pagan
6

Russians in the war, and “ Wilhelm as their Tsar.”11 His conclusion was that none
of these religious dissenters were loyal, and that their faith determined their political
allegiance. The dissent itself, however, was considered a product of a German
conspiracy to weaken Orthodoxy by promoting Protestant beliefs. This conspiracy
was supposedly carried over through the German settlers who were invited by
Catherine II to colonize the South Russian steppes. Right after the start of the war,
the Bishop of Tavrida and Simferopol Dimitriy wrote to the governor of Tavrida in
a special report of 4 October, 1914 that, “being nurtured by Russia, Germans, who
were invited to develop agriculture, had thanked their new fatherland by planting
Stundism and God-hated Baptism.”12 That statement, does in fact carry some truth,
but not in a sense of deliberate ‘planting.’
Germanic settlers did play an important role in the origins of the two main
branches of Evangelical movement in Russia – the Baptists and the Stundists
(“Evangelical Christians”). The emergence of a new stream of Pietist and
Evangelical renewal in the 1860s precipitated a religious ferment not only among
isolated colonists but their Slavic neighbors as well. Johann Oncken, a Baptist
preacher from Hamburg, arrived in Southern Russia in the 1860s, preaching not
only among the German Baptist colonies of Novorossia, but also among
Mennonites and Lutherans. He baptized and “ordained”13 Abraham Unger, a
Mennonite from the village of Einlage (Kitchkass) near Alexandrovsk, who later

11S. I. Golovashchenko, Istoriya Yevangel’sko-Baptistskogo Dvizheniya V
Ukrainye: Materialy I Dokumenty (Odessa: Bogomysliye, 1998) 163.
12“Oblagodetelstvovannye Rossiyeyu nemtsy, priglashonnye nasazhdat’
agrikulturu, otblagodarili svoye novoye otechestvo tem tol’ko, chto nasadili shtundu
i bogomerzkyi baptizm.” From: Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Avtonomnoy Respubliki
Krym, Simferopol. [GAARK, State Archives of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea, Simferopol.] Fond No. 26, Opis 3, File 911. All references below are
based on the microfilm copy at the Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies -Fresno
Tavrida Collection.
13Report, submitted to the Department of Religious Affairs, 27 February, 1915.
From: Tsentralnyy Gosudarstvenny Istoricheskiy Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii
[TsGIARF, Central State Historical Archives of Russian Federation , St.
Petersburg] Fond
821,Opis 133, Delo 319. CMBS-Fresno St. Petersburg
Collection, Reel 16.
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split away from the mainline Mennonite Church, and formed a new church of
Mennonite Brethren, together with Gerhard Wieler and several other separatists.
Wieler and Unger baptized many Russian and Ukrainian converts and were
instrumental in forming the Russian Baptist Union, of which Wieler was chairman
until 1886.
Yet the new formed believer groups often were able to function on their
own, as many German preachers went into exile or were threatened with
imprisonment.14 In the Trans-Caucasus conversions occurred under the influence of
German Baptist Martin Kalweit.15 However, many conversions also occurred
among the Molokans – a dissenting Old Believers’ group, which emerged
independently of the Western influence, but possessed profound similarities with
the Evangelicals.16 Many ‘converts’ did not associate themselves with any union,
and the population often christened them as “Stundists,” as their services originally
only lasted for one hour (in German, eine Stunde), in a traditional German
Protestant way. In the nation’s capital, St. Petersburg, Evangelical teachings spread
also among some lower nobility, with the influences of British Lord Radstock, in
the so-called Pashkov’s Circle.
Sectarians’ open friendship with the ‘Germans,’ often made it harder for the
colonists to build their places of worship. In 1893, petitions of the Mennonites of
Kotlyarevka, Memrik and New York to build their own prayer houses were rejected

14Ibid.
15A. V. Karev “Ruskoye Yevangel’sko-Baptistskoye Dvizheniye,” in M. S.
Karetnikova, ed. Al’manakh Po Istorii Russkogo Baptizma (St.Petersburg: Bibliya
Dla Vsekh, 1997) 108-109.
16M.S. Karetnikova “Russkoye Bogoiskatel’stvo: Natsional’nyye Korni
Yevangel’sko-Baptistskogo Dvizheniya,” Al’manakh Po Istorii Russkogo Baptizma
(St.Petersburg: Bibliya Dla Vsekh, 1997) 66. In her article (pp.3-83), Karetnikova
(Professor of History at St. Petersburg Christian University) conducts a thorough
investigation of the non-Western roots of Russian Evangelicalism going back to the
Middle Ages and Russian Renaissance of the 16th century. Hans-Christian Diedrich
in his Siedler, Sektierer und Stundisten (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1985)
60-79 also discusses the question of Evangelical/Baptist roots in the medieval
dissent and the role played by the German settlers.
8

based on their “fanaticism and desire to convert Orthodox people.”17 In 1896, a
number of similar applications to the Kherson and Samara gubernia were turned
down by the governors, who feared that the church buildings would attract curious
peasants to learn of the “German faith.”18 Of course, none of these cases were ever
considered without consulting first with the local bishops, who generally advised
the governors not to give permission to the colonists.

‘The worshipers of the German Caesar!’

17Correspondence between Ekaterinoslav governor and Dept of Religious Affairs,
Sept-Nov 1893. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1026. CMBS Reel 3.
18Ibid. Correspondence of Dept of Religious Affairs with Kherson and Samara
governors.
9

The Pobedonostzev era of 1890s signaled the worst days of persecution for these new
groups, but in the early 1900s, the persecution subsided to the point of granting complete
freedom in 1905. But the pressures resumed in 1912 and 1913. In 1913, a 140 - page report was
submitted to the 4th State Duma featuring complaints about the Evangelicals in various
gubernias, whose prayer houses were shut down and rights to worship curbed due to accusations
of pan-Germanism, among other things.19 Already in 1902-1903 such a charge was addressed in
General I. I. Filipenko’s correspondence with the Bishop of Simferopol and Tavrida. The
general, stationed in Sevastopol, criticized some of the Orthodox priests’ imputation against
sectarians. He found that apart from being called the “Anti-Christs,” the Stundists allegedly “are
tools of Pan-Germanism….they worship their Caesar and are not loyal to the authorities.” On the
other hand, Filipenko noted that some priests also “ridicule the Stundists’ honesty and loyalty,
good way of living. ” After spending some time among them, he was appalled at the made-up
accusations of their “worship of Germanhood,” calling them “solid Great-Russians.”20
By the beginning of the World War, the Evangelicals turned from being labelled antichrists themselves to being charged with collecting money for “German Wilhelm, the AntiChrist.”21 According to a different report, it was actually Wilhelm who gave the sectarians
money. In February 1915 the Ministry of Internal Affairs circulated a departmental report,
Assessments of South-Russian Sectarianism,22 in which Bismarck was allegedly responsible for
transferring a “billion[milliard] rubles” for the cause of Evangelical proselytism in Russia out of
“political and statist motivations.”23 These motivations were formulated by German philosopher
Hartmann that “in order to conquer the Russians, their spirit, i.e. Orthodoxy needs to be
weakened.”24

19TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 311. Reel 16.
20
I. I. Filipenko correspondence with the Bishop of Tavrida and Ministry of Internal Affairs.
TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1042. CMBS Reel 23.
21M.D. Timoshenko’s testimony, quoted in Paul D. Steeves, “The Russian Baptist Union, 19171935 Evangelical Awakening in Russia”, PhD Diss. (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms,
1978) 93.
22Zaklyucheniya O Yuzhno Russkom Sektanstve TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel
29.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
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The local authorities often diligently endeavored to expose some of these secret money
transfers. On 15 March 1915 the Ataman of the Terek Cossack District reported on local
observations about the church of “Evangelical Christians” in the village of Ilarionovskoye. The
preacher of the mostly-Russian congregation, Kasper Goebbel, was found preaching “thou shalt
not kill” to his conscripted parishioners, encouraging them to “shoot up in the air,” lest they be
“murderers.” In response to the parishioners’ request to pray for the Tsar, the pastor responded
that the Tsar was a “Herod leading his people to slaughter.”25 The suspicions of the authorities
only increased after they saw Kaspar Goebbel becoming rich within his first three years of
preaching. Goebbel went from a poor peasant to possessing a 30,000-ruble estate. During August
1914, right before the war, he propagated with “special rigor,” while on the day of the
proclamation of war, he gathered all his German friends in a secluded meeting in his home.26 All
this gave the ataman enough reason to report Goebbel as a spy paid by German intelligence, and
his preaching as indoctrinating propaganda.
For many public figures, the fight against the ‘indoctrination’ became essential to the war
effort. Vostorgov’s speech titled “A Hostile Spiritual Avant-garde” drew many supporters, as he
presented his logic as follows:
“We are being overridden by the German faith. The sectarian propagandists are
demoralizing our spirit. History warns us that a cultural takeover usually precedes
a military takeover. The Baptists and the Adventists originated in Lutheranism;
they regularly receive financial aid and literature from Germany. It would be
naςve to think that this help comes from German concern to save Russia. It is to
destroy Russia. If German soldiers should appear in our streets today, we would
fall upon them and put them behind prison walls. Yet the German faith has
invaded us, and we do nothing. As we would war with German troops, so let us
war with German ideas!”27
“The traitors of the Tsar and friends of the Teutons”28 carried a threat to cultural identity. The
governor of Tavrida prompted the Military Governor-General of Novorossia Ebelov to close the
prayer houses in strategic coastal cities on the Black Sea not only because of the Evangelicals’

25March 15, 1915 Ataman Shevchenko report to the Minister of Internal Affairs. TsGIARF,
Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 29.
26Ibid.
27Summarized in Andrew Q. Blane, “The Relations Between the Russian Protestant Sects and
the State, 1900-1921". PhD Diss. Duke University, 1964) 88.
28Quoting 20 Feb 1915 patriotic proclamation in Kolokol. Blane 89.
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ties to Germany, but also because of the new faith’s erosion “of Russian traits in converted
persons…and their attainment of indifference to everything Russian.”29 The Bishop of
Simferopol argued that after one’s acceptance of Baptism, “high moral qualities of the Russian
soul…are completely destroyed in the human being and make a person unrecognizable.”30 The
already–mentioned Assessments outlined three main centers where German cultural propaganda
was printed and distributed by the Evangelical preachers in Russia: “1) International Tract
Society in Hamburg; 2) I. F. Grote Publications in Petrogradl; 3) H. J. Braun Publications in
Halbstadt colony, Tavrida gubernia.”31
By the end of 1914, one of the avenues of propaganda – Halbstadt’s “Raduga
Publications” was closed. Mennonite Brethren Heinrich J. Braun and president of Evangelical
Christian Union Ivan Prokhanov managed this enterprise. Raduga Publications was shut down on
17 December, 1914 by order of the Odessa Military Governor-General, mainly on charges of
pan-Germanism in both German and Russian Baptist literature that was published at Raduga.
The former was simply linguistically unpatriotic and the latter was propagandist. Funded by local
Germans, publishing this literature in Russian for German consumption did not make any sense,
and thus was used to contaminate Russian minds with the ideas of “rotten Western German
rationalistic sects.”32 In January 1915, after a series of petitions by H. Braun, “Raduga” was
allowed to re-open, as long as no Baptist or uncensored German books were to be published
again. Braun and Prokhanov found themselves in a dilemma: it was unpatriotic to publish
German books, but it was also anti-Orthodox (and thus, equally unpatriotic) to publish Russian
Baptist ones. In June 1915, the Petrograd mayor wrote his conclusion to the Minister of Internal
Affairs that, “inspired by their German Adventist and Stundo-Baptist preachers, these sects have
such a strong influence from Germany, that they, but especially Baptists, are nothing but
nurseries of Germanism in Russia.”33

2912 March 1915 Letter from Tavrida governor to Governor-General Ebelov, TsGIARF, Fond
1292, Opis 5, Delo 340. Reel 29.
30Report to Bishop Dimitriy of the priest of Maryanovka, Berdyansk uyezd Evthimiy
Yevzhenko.
GAARK, Fond 26, Opis 3, Delo 911.
31Zaklyucheniye.
32GAARK, Coll. 26, Inv. 3, File 911. Report to Bishopd Dimitriy of the priest of Maryanovka,
Berdyansk uyezd Evthimiy Yevzhenko.
33TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12.
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On 3 August 1915, Minister of Internal Affairs Shcherbatov announced in that famous
Duma session that “among…[the Baptists] along with those who are sincere believers, there are
not a few undoubted tools of the German government.”34 Despite the protest on behalf of the
Social-Democrats and especially Skobelev, the Baptist leaders continued to be exiled, and their
hospitals and prayer houses sealed up. Later on, Father Stanislavsky of the Right party, stated in
the Duma that the Stundists were simply “implanted” by the Germans forty years ago to initiate
the destruction of Russia from within. He went on to allege that conscripted sectarians in the
army “surrender at first opportunity,” and hope for Germany’s military victory so that their “true
Evangelical faith, will flourish.”35 He then urged that a resolution be adopted to classify these
sectarians (Stundists, Adventists and New Israelites) as subversive to the war effort, and to
resume the persecutions of the Pobedonostzev era. Otherwise, he thought, the sectarians who
viewed German culture as superior might themselves usher the defeat upon the Monarchy.
These accusations, however, prompted a series of responses from the Baptist-Evangelical
leadership. Ivan S. Prokhanov wrote many petitions to the government calling for release of the
imprisoned preachers and assuring Evangelicals’ support of the war effort. In one petition, he
referred to the “heroic deeds” of his believers on the front, and presented an argument that while
Jews or Tatar Muslims may openly profess their faith, Evangelical Christians “Russians by
nature”[russkiye po prirodye] are denied full freedom.36 Indeed, many believers joined the army
and supported the war. After all, in Goebbel’s case, it was his own parishioners who reported the
pastor’s unpatriotic behavior to the authorities. Prayers for the Emperor and collections of funds
for the war needs were commonplace among the Evangelicals, while the official Evangelical
publications from the war period carried hardly any anti-war literature.37 Prokhanov, Pavlov and
many others, however, realized that their believers’ attitudes towards the war could not comply

34John S. Curtiss, Church and State in Russia; the Last Years of the Empire, 1900-1917 (New
York:Octagon Books, 1965) 384.
35Ibid., 385.
36
Letter from 29 August 1915. TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12
37Paul D. Steeves in pages 92-94 describes manifestations of Evangelical patriotism, such as
opening of church-sponsored hospitals for the wounded, public prayers and services for the
victory in Moscow and victory vigils near the Winter Palace in Petrograd organized by
Prokhanov. Also, A. I. Klibanov History of Religious Sectarianism in Russia (1860s-1917),
trans. Ethel Dunn (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982) 332-333. Majority of patriotic manifestations,
however, took place in large cities: Moscow, Petrograd, Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, Tiflis.
13

with the denominational position; because historically, there simply was none. Many Evangelical
Christians functioned without a union for over fifty years, allowing each individual pastor and/or
believer to interpret the war through the lenses of their own Bible reading. The Chief Prosecutor
of the Holy Synod was amazed at the Stundist peasants’ theology of war when they refused to
pray for the army, stating,
“One need not to pray for the Russian victory: for if we will pray about it, then the
Germans will pray for their victory too, and then the war will continue without an
end.”38
Thus, Prokhanov and other Petersburg denominational leaders did not have many cards to
play the note of the believers’ unanimous support for the war. Yet there was one argument that
they sought to employ against the allegations of pan-Germanism. That ‘card’ was a British
connection. In the winter of 1915-1916, Petrograd’s branch of the YMCA was suddenly shut
down on charges of spying for Germany. While Novoye Vremya praised the decision, a very
different reaction came from its patron – Senator Graf Pahlen, an Evangelical sympathizer, who
openly stated that the organization was of Anglo-American, and not German character, and thus
drew suspicion from many of the Lutherans. He accused the editor of Novoye Vremya of
ignorance, and claimed that the decision had nothing to do with its pan-Germanist character.
There was an undeniable support for the YMCA by Petrograd’s Baptists, but the society itself
always carried a non-denominational character. Stating that the Association was founded in
England - Russia’s ally, Graf Pahlen concluded that the decision to close down the YMCA was
not well thought out. He then presented the Evangelicals as true patriots, who support the war,
prayed for the Emperor, for the victory, and collected funds for the needs of the war and the
needs of the wounded.39 Their “brethren in England” did the same.
In the confidential correspondence between the Supervisor of the Department of
Religious Affairs and the Department of Police supervisor Klimovich it was surprising that the
government was indeed aware of the British influences over the Baptists. Citing an Okhrana
(Russia’s secret service) report, the letter spoke of two branches of missionaries responsible for

385 Feb 1915, Report of Chief Prosecutor of Holy Synod to the Minister of Internal Affairs
about the Elizavetpol gubernia peasant sectarian attitudes to war. TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5,
Delo 340. Reel 29.
39TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12. Ivan Prokhanov to Petrograd’s
gradonachalnik [mayor].
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supporting the Evangelical-Baptist movement: the Germans and Anglo-Americans. It further
stated:
“Under the influence of the Germans, the anti-state and anti-militarist tendencies
are developed among the Evangelical Christians and the Baptists. The English
organizations are trying to keep the sectarians loyal and in their publications call
on Russian sectarians to be law-obedient.”40
Despite this, the government still decided to deport Petrograd’s preacher R. Fetler - not
as a German spy, but as an “agent of London, funded by England and Pioneer Mission of
America.”41 He was allegedly plotting to “help England make of Russia an English colony.”42 In
the eyes of the reaction-minded officials, the allies in the war against German troops were not
necessarily the allies in the war against ‘German faith.’ Later in 1916 came also a call to refuse
the American Baptist Mission Organization access to work among the prisoner-of-war camps in
Russia. The ABMO was referred to as “one of the most dangerous sectarian promoters in Russia,
funding many Evangelicals.” At its conference in America, the report claimed, the “German,
British and Russian Baptists were seated next to each other.”43 An inter-national mélange of this
sort was clearly a violation of the patriotic Union Sacré that sectarians needed to uphold. In that
respect the Russian Evangelicals seemed similar (or related) to another group in Europe that
shared the same degree of internationalist connections – the socialists. Indeed the Socialists of
England, Russia, Germany, despite being torn by the warring nationalistic tendencies, still shared
the same ideological persuasion and increasingly, toward the end of the war, were coming to
hold very similar conclusions about the casus belli.

“The Socialists, the Anarchists, the Cosmopolitans”
In May of 1878, a student from St. Petersburg Technological institute, Ivan

40Okhrana Report. TsGIARF, Fond 821,Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12
41Ibid.
42Steeves, 95. For a full account of Fetler’s life journey, see Oswald A. Blumit, Sentenced to
Siberia (Wheaton, IL, 1943)
43TSGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 309. Reel 12. Russia’s ecclesiastic xenophobia steered
American Baptists to send more requests and defend their Russian fellow believers against the
charges of pan-Germanism even after the February Revolution. Robert S. Latimer “An Open
Letter to the Russian Minister for the Interior.” Gospel in Russia, 1917, Apr-June: 2-5.
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Basov, appeared in the Stundist villages in Kherson gubernia, spreading “revolutionary
propaganda” with slogans like “Down with Aristocracy!” and “People, seek your rights!” In the
correspondence between the Kherson governor and Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was found that
Basov’s official excuse for going there was to study the “psychology” of the Stundist sects, but
the Ministry also suggested a connection between Basov’s revolutionary activities at home and
his desire to see the Stundists.44 Indeed, many saw the connection between a desire for a
religious and a social liberation, and the government in the early years of Evangelicalism saw the
two concepts equally attractive among the peasants. “Communism is the bait with which
Stundists catch neophytes,” said a gubernial report to Novorossia Governor-General in 1867.45
In 1902-1903 correspondence of General I. I. Filipenko and Bishop of Tavrida, the
allegations of sectarian socialist affiliation seemed absurd. In March 1903 he wrote,
“Despite the accusations of socialism and disrespect for the authorities, the
Stundists actually propagate very conservative political views. They do not share
socialist views on property, and are actively involved in private enterprise. They
urge their members to pray for the Tsar and the authorities and stamp out any
form of liberalism.”46
The conservative elements in the government, however, saw the dissenters to be more
loyal to their international connections than to the Monarchy. In early 1900s customs and
censorship officials seized many books, tracts and devotional literature published in England and
Germany.47 Evangelical preachers in exile before 1905 went to places like Switzerland or
England, rallying for foreign pressure against the suppression of religious freedom. Even after
1905, the authorities looked at the international ‘cosmopolitan’ connections with suspicion. After
all, it did look suspicious that sectarian leaders like Prokhanov or Mazaev, being of lower class,
or even peasant background, enjoyed recognition and support from elite Protestant circles
abroad. Some in the government were also afraid of those elites aiding sectarians visibly at home
or dictating to them ideological principles. At the Baptist congress in Odessa in September of

44TsGIARF, Fond 1284, Opis 220, Delo 19.
45Quoted in Klibanov, 259.
46TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 5, Delo 1042. Reel 23.
47Central Committee for Foreign Censorship, 23 March 1906 detailed report on intercepted
Adventist literature from Philadelphia and Hamburg. Tracts and books describing the “mark of
the Beast” of all those who violated the Sabbath. TsGIARF, Fond 776, Opis 12, Delo 10. Reel
23.
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1908, a prominent preacher from Pennsylvania declared, “We need to elevate the poor, so that
they reach equality with the rich.”48 During the congress in 1909 one of the foreign visitors
preached to the public a clearly ‘Marxist’ message: “from every one according to their abilities,
to everyone according to their need.”49 These and some other incidents prompted the Ministry of
Internal Affairs in November of 1911 to reject the president of the Baptist Alliance Rev.
MacAlpine’s plans to visit churches in Russia. Despite the appeals to allow MacAlpine into
Russia, including a letter from ambassador C. Guild and recommendation from Theodore
Roosevelt (who was, then, editor of The Outlook Magazine), the Ministry was very reluctant to
allow him operate among Russians, citing that the Baptist Alliance was “too socialist and
cosmopolitan.” The same year the appeal to allow St. Petersburg Evangelical Christians to open
a seminary was denied as well.50
Socialism and the Evangelical movement alike sustained well-developed international
ties and maintained a closely-knit network of public agitation. Both appealed to and found
support among the mostly lower classes. Both envisioned (especially given the Evangelicals’
post-millennialism) the coming of the brotherhood-of-all-men, an egalitarian society, though
they had differing opinions about the avenues through which a future paradise might arrive. Both
groups endured many years of mistreatment and persecution, and both had their martyrs and their
traitors. It is no surprise that the government proclaimed both groups equally destructive to the
war effort. They threatened the very survival of Russian ‘genuine culture,’ as they tried to
present their own alternative to the ideals of Tsar, Faith and Motherland. On 7 March 1915 the
Ministry of Internal Affairs sent a secret circular to the heads of the police departments and
gendarmerie, to increase the pressure on the sectarians and socialists alike. The circular stated
that “close ties have been established between the destructive attempts of the revolutionaries and
those who undermine the predominance of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Therefore, both
groups possessed the same goal -- “to overthrow the Imperial regime.” The circular goes on to
state that the Adventists “acquired the tendencies of anarchism,” Dukhobors exert “anti-

48Baptist, 1908, No. 12; quoted in Golovashchenko, 154.
49He was elaborating on the parable of Jesus about late-coming workers, underlining that
principle as an eternal Gospel law, but not a political one. Baptist, 1909, No. 18;
Golovashchenko, 155.
50Correspondence between Rev. MacAlpine and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Oct-Nov
1911. TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Dielo 273. Reel 14.
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militarism, socialism, cosmopolitism,” while the Stundists possessed “social-democratic
tendencies.” The Baptists “not once proclaimed themselves as opponents of the current regime,”
they aspired to a “social rebellion” and “inspire the workers to fight the Government.”51 In a
different report, the Ministry of Interior claimed the dissenters’ wide use of revolutionary slogans
in the church services. According to Prokhanov’s newspaper Utrennyaya Zvezda, the believers in
Moscow instead of praying for the Tsar, prayed for the well-being of all Emperors and all
armies, as well as for abatement of warfare.52 The secret service (Okhrana) reported tendencies
of “antimilitarism, socialism and cosmopolitism”53 to the Ministry of Interior many times, but
stated that such tendencies were more common among the capital’s Baptists than Evangelical
Union members.
The conspiracy of Socialist-Evangelical common plot seemed reasonable to those who
observed the Social Democrat defense of the sectarians in the political arena even before the war.
Following the Duma report of shutting down various places of worship on 3 May 1913, a heated
discussion followed. During the dispute, Social Democrats Petrovsky (Bolshevik fraction) and
Skobelev (a Menshevik) attacked the policies of harassment adopted by both Orthodox
missionaries and local police authorities. Interrupted during their speech by some of the more
conservative members of the Duma such as Chkheidze and Purishkevich (the latter one was
described by Petrovsky as a “clown”), they called for an immediate resolution to stop these
police excesses. Their proposal was protested by the reports of Father Popov of Voronezh and
Fr. Mitrotsky from Kiev, where Baptists and sectarians were referred to as “anti-church and antistate.”54 Their ideas were considered revolutionary and subversive. Yet the arguments extended
by Petrovsky and Skobelev included denunciation of religious fanaticism and religion alike.
Proclaiming themselves atheists, they stated that sectarians’ plight interested them only because
of their ideological motivations. They viewed sectarianism as a religious expression of the

51Golovashchenko, 157.
52Utrennyaya Zvezda, No. 8, Friday, 20 Febr 1915. CMBS-Fresno Reel 12.
53TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331. Reel 12.
54
TsGIARF, Ibid. Minutes of Duma meeting on 3 May 1913.
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masses’ craving for revolution.55 The speech itself was published in the Utrennyaya Zvezda and
received mixed reviews from Prokhanov.
Among the left, there was a clear division of opinion about the Evangelicals. A. Q. Blane
argues that at least until 1905, Lenin fully shared the view that the sectarians would be major
assistants in building the proletarian state.56 Lenin’s colleague Bonch-Bruyevich defended this
position even after the Revolution. There were, however, two major impediments to the
recognition of sectarians as a leftist revolutionary movement. First, was the lack of revolutionary
class conscience amidst their leadership. Indeed, Baptist functionaries like D. Mazaev, Pavlov,
Balikhin, Zakharov, while from a poorer background, ended up becoming successful
entrepreneurs. The Baptists and Stundists alike sought not to overthrow the regime but to
improve their situation through communal and hard work. Their sober lifestyle together with a
network of assisting ‘brotherly help,’ fostered their economic improvement. While the majority
never reached a status of nobility or large scale land ownership, there were many examples of
landless peasants becoming successful artisans, village teachers, and sharecroppers.57 There were
also some nobles affiliated with Evangelicals and often facilitating avenues of financial and
political assistance. Baron von Korf, Countess Lieven, Baron Nikolaii, Graf Pahlen were all
members of the capital’s aristocracy interested in the Evangelicals’ cause. The second factor was
the movement’s essential ties to the Russian-German landowners. The Stundists and the Baptists
learned their techniques in land cultivation, and, often enjoyed not only hiring privileges, but
also much better treatment from their bosses in industries owned by Russian Germans. They
thus maintained strong contacts with their German brethren, who provided them with economic
and religious patronage. Popular Russian writer Sholokhov, in his historical drama about the
Russian revolution Tikhiy Don (The Quiet Don), included a remark about the four hundred
workers in the Martens factory in Millerovo. When asked about the revolutionary activity in that
factory, one of the characters in the story responds that “these are not real proletarians because
they are all well-to-do. Everyone has their own house, a wife, and all kinds of luxuries. And half

55As a result, the Duma did not pass any of the resolutions proposed by Petrovsky and Skobelev,
but ended instead with the adoption of unanimous congratulation telegram to His Imperial
Majesty for the occasion of the Tsar’s May 6th birthday .
56Blane, 118-122.
57A. I. Klibanov places an emphasis on the kulak tendencies among the rural Evangelicals, as
well as their cooperation with the “bourgeois upper strata of Baptism.” pp260-266.
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of them are Baptist. Their own boss – is their preacher, so, that one hand washes the other…”58
Close co-operation between the dissenters and various ‘well-to-do’ brethren encouraged
entrepreneurship and dissuaded them from open participation in revolutionary activity.
Being to a certain degree at odds with both the left and the right compelled Prokhanov,
Mazaev and others to walk a thin line of appeasement to the ruling regime. It was dangerous to
associate with the right-wing German landowners, who supported and aided Evangelicals on
functional levels throughout the provinces. But it was even more dangerous to claim affinity with
the left-wing Social Democrats, and their calls to halt the war. While some of the believers
sympathized with the Socialists, others (especially the artisans or entrepreneurs) supported the
right-wing cause and associated closely with German farmers. The leadership, found itself at a
loss to discourage the associations, and to develop a consistent war ethic that could be effectively
communicated to the parishioners. This was, frankly, an impossible task. As a result, much of the
decision was left up to the individuals, where the Evangelical leadership only went half way to
meet the war’s demands. They prayed for peace and for the Tsar, but they failed to pray for
victory.59

‘The Unpatriotic Malingerers’
Much as in other European countries, World War I in Russia kicked off with a series of
patriotic parades and demonstrations. While the victory was considered sure and imminent, the
war itself was proclaimed holy. In the Second Great Patriotic War, as it was called,60 Russian
soldiers marched in the parades with slogans and images of Mother Russia they swore to
protect. The use of a portrait of an aged woman with teary eyes full of compassion was more
than just a sentimental gesture to the troops. The maternal imagery was to communicate to the
soldiers whom they defended, for whose cause they fought. Failure to keep and protect was an
abomination in society’s eyes, an abhorrent neglect of a man’s duty. Yet, even though the
soldiers soon realized that they were not fighting for Mother Russia but for Father Nick and

58Quoted in A. Reinmarus, and G. Friesen, Mennonity (Moscow: Bezbozhnik, 1930) 34.
59A paraphrase from I. Vostorgov, “Yeshyo O Nemetskoy Vere, Otvet g. Fetleru,” Pravoslavnyi
Blagovestnik, No. 12, 1914, pp 4-7; quoted in Steeves, 93.
60Soviet historians later rejected the name, officially placing the title “Second Great Patriotic
War” to WW II.
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Uncle George, malingering and desertion were still viewed as immoral crimes in the military
ranks.
They were signs of individual opportunism, and of self-preservation at the expense of
others. Many Evangelicals were charged with these crimes. Reel 29 of the CMBS Collection
contains several files about hundreds of Evangelical Union members, Baptists, Malevantsy,
Tolstovtsy, Adventists who refused to take up arms or to accept the draft. Andrew Q. Blane
states that by 1916 there were 837 sectarians who refused to be conscripted.61 Yet, this figure
applies only to conscription. While in the army, hundreds more deserted or refused to shoot at
the enemy. Many preached the peace message among the troops, “love your enemy” and “thou
shalt not kill” commandments. Even the hospitals where the Evangelicals served the wounded
were under suspicion: as early as December 1914, the General Staff prohibited the wounded
from being sent to Petrograd’s Dom Evangeliya (“House of the Gospel” – Prokhanov’s church)
hospital, because of the anti-militarist propaganda soldiers there received. In 1916 the hospital
was simply closed down.62 In that year, Petrograd Evangelical churches were closed down too,
as many soldiers attended the meetings where preachers allegedly described the war as
“conduced by Satan, impeding the imminent coming of the Kingdom of Christ.”63 Thus, not only
did they conspire with Germans to destroy Russian culture and with Socialists to overthrow the
regime, but the Evangelicals now also viewed the war as threatening their beliefs, hoping for
soon Christ’s return.
At the outset of war, the Baptists and the Evangelical Union believers reassured the
government of their support of the war effort. Some even could pinpoint military obligations as
formulated in their official theology. The 1906 Russian Baptist Confession of faith declared the
believers to be “obligated” [obyazany] to perform “military duty.”64 Evangelical Christian
Confession of Faith (developed by P. M. Friesen in 1903, later revised by Prokhanov) stated that

61Blane, 95. Klibanov only lists 343, page 335. However, not all Evangelicals called themselves
‘Baptists’ or ‘Evangelical Christians,’ some avoiding to mention any denominational affiliation
fearing that as a consequence, their ministers could be exiled. Considering also sectarians’
pacifism within the army ranks, it is very hard to give an adequate and final number of the
Evangelical pacifists.
62TsGIARF, Fond 821, Opis 133, Delo 331.
63Ibid. August 11, 1916 report from Department of Religious Affairs.
64Article XIII, Veroutcheniye Yevangel’skikh Khristian-Baptistov (Rostov-na-Donu: F. P.
Pavlov Printing, 1906) 13. Reel 15.
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“we consider military service to be a duty, but have fellowship with those who think
otherwise.”65 Yet, in chapter XI of the Evangelical Christian Confession of Faith (“On the
Freedom of the Christian and Freedom of Conscience”) believers were urged to pray to “uphold
peace,” and “reject violence.”66 This certainly reflected some of the pacifist inclinations within
the Evangelical community but also addressed the individual beliefs of each member.
Throughout the year 1915, I. S. Prokhanov, kept up correspondence with the military and civil
officials attempting to persuade them of the Evangelicals’ loyalty in service. When Novorossia
Governor General Ebelov deported a number of ministers to Western Siberia (Tomsk region),
Prokhanov appealed in February 1915 against the “bogus stories” (fantasticheskiye razskazy) of
Evangelicals’ pacifism and pan-Germanism. He stated that the ministers should remain in South
Russia to serve the parishioners whose sons went to war.67 Ebelov, in return, sent a list of
sectarians who refused to fight or to be conscripted in Simferopol and Berdyansk uyezds,
including a statement collected from one Evangelical, that “it is better to die from execution for
treason, than at the slaughter [boynya].”68 In the summer of 1915, Prokhanov steered away the
sealing of his own Petrograd congregations by providing a list of the Evangelicals who earned
military honors at the front.69

Yet, he could not address the issue of propaganda of

“antimilitarist ideas” that were becoming common by late 1915.70 By the end of 1916, the
augmentation of war fatigue was also felt among the Evangelicals. In January 1917, Chief
chaplain of the Military and Navy reported to the Commander V. I. Romeiko-Gurko:
“Thousands of them refuse to fight. They believe that they rather would go to jail
than to fight, because ‘while we are in jail, your Orthodox soldiers die in the
battles, but our life God saves for His miraculous purposes….’ Sectarians hope

65My priznayom voinskuyu povinnost’ kak obrok, no imeyem obshcheniye s tem kto inatche
myslet v etom voprosye. Article XVI, Veroutcheniye Yevangel’skikh Khristian (St. Petersburg:
Raduga Publications, 1910) 40. Istoriya Yevangel’skikh Khristian Baptistov v SSSR (Moscow,
AUECB, 1989) 440-447 contains a description how P.M. Friesen compiled the original Ev.
Christians’ Confession of Faith in 1903, how it was approved at the 1909 Ekaterinoslav and
Odessa Evangelical Christian conferences, and later slightly revised (and published) by
Prokhanov in 1910.
66Ibid. 26.
67TsGIARF, Fond 1292, Opis 5, Delo 340.
68Ibid., response of Governor-General Ebelov to Menkin.
69Ibid., Prokhanov’s letter.
70Golovashchenko, 161.
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for the revolution, which according to them, is supposed to happen soon, stating
that ‘we would sweep you away with the palms of revolution.”71
According to him, “the sectarians in the army are more dangerous than the ones who
refuse to take up arms.”72 Because, it is in the army that they would conduct the propaganda,
attempting to convert other disenchanted soldiers. Their subversive behavior proved to the
Imperial military authorities that the Evangelicals were conspiring to preserve themselves while
letting others fight for the Monarchy. Perhaps, the enemy’s victory could even be advantageous
to them, they thought. The antimilitarist trends were not particularly strong in the cities. In
Prokhanov’s correspondence with the authorities, evidence of popular support and enlistment
was documented mostly in cities – Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Samara. The list of the sectarian
malingerers within the army on Reel 29 contains no persons from a major city. Most were from
rural areas, where local pressures against Evangelicals always tended to be stronger, and the
central government’s reach weaker. It was there, that the dissenting peasants nurtured their
understanding of the Gospel, based on the literal approach to many passages, including the
Sermon on the Mount.
The leadership’s attempt to rally unanimous support of the war among believers was
almost as vain as the attempts of the Imperial government to fight it victoriously. Many peasant
believers were prepared to stand by their convictions – after all, they were much better adapted
to persecution than their brethren in Petersburg. By the early 1920s, Prokhanov courted
Bolshevik government (with limited success) for recognition of Conscientious Objector status
for Evangelicals, as the pacifist beliefs constituted some of their values. Overall, the world war
experience taught the Evangelical leadership about the dangers of political alignment, and
contributed to their search for neutrality in relations with the state. It also attributed to future
bitter relations between the sectarians and the militaristic Communist state, which may have
appreciated Evangelical opposition to Tsarism on one hand, but wanted even greater loyalty, on
the other. There was also bitterness between those originally loyal to the Tsar (who fled the
country and formed émigré communities abroad) and new Prokhanov-style leadership seeking
cooperation with the Soviets. Yet political non-alignment even now continues to play a

71Ibid., 162-163
72Ibid.
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prominent role in shaping the framework of Evangelical-Baptist relations to the state, as these
groups grow and consolidate themselves in the countries of the post-Soviet world.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a sense, the internal public policy toward the Evangelicals during World War I was the
1905 Manifesto put on trial. Liberties that were granted in 1905-1907 were now either suspended
or abolished. The pursuit of military victories prompted significant civil liberty restrictions. Yet,
this state of emergency led to policies that in no way relieved the country. These limitations of
rights and liberties as well as military losses in many ways caused a more rapid deterioration of
the institutions of Russian monarchism and overall order inside the country. The conspiracy
theories created to implicate the sectarians were neither provable nor successful. But they did
produce a sense of insecurity, among believers, after so blatant a shattering of their 1905
freedoms.
What followed in the 1920s were new freedoms, and significant improvements in their
plight, but the horrors of Stalinism eradicated any hopes for a peaceful coexistence of the
minority and the majority in Russia. It is no surprise that many Evangelicals today still view
most freedoms with suspicion, and that the majority of Baptist-Pentecostal emigrants left the
former Soviet Union after 1991. This was all despite the fact that precisely in 1991 the
Evangelicals were granted the most extensive civil and religious freedoms ever. Their experience
for the last 150 years, however, was unfortunately one of continuing bust-and-boom, emigration
and restrictions. Only time will tell how secure they can be in the new Russia (or new
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, etc.), a country leaping to bridge the gap between itself and
the West.
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